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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR. SMIT
QUESTION, MR. KING: I have a question. In treaty disputes, would
you say that the Rome Treaty is subject to European Union (EU)
jurisdiction?
ANSWER, MR. SMIT: Yes. All the implementing measures also.
QUESTION, MR. KING: Is trade law is pretty well defined?
ANSWER, MR. SMIT: Not too defined. The court writes the rules as it
goes along. These are sensible rules, so it is okay.
QUESTION, MR. BROSCH: In the dealings we have had with the
Europeans over the last few years, one of the problems we have had has been
this issue of shared competence. For example, you go to Brussels to
negotiate an agreement on an issue and you are dealing with the people in
Brussels who are supposedly writing the rules. However, there are fifteen
different member states enforcing rules in fifteen different ways. You do not
have any relationship with those fifteen other folks. It is hard to have any
confidence in what is really going on over there. How do you think this
concept of shared competence is going to evolve over time?
ANSWER, MR. SMIT: Under the treaty, there was just no doubt that
there is the power in the community institutions to do what they want to do.
However, as a political matter, the member states see that they are losing the
power. The term sovereignty is meaningless, but it has a lot of emotional
appeal. The member states are saying, "We are losing our sovereignty."
They cooked up something called the subsidiary principle; that the
community should not act unless the states cannot act. My colleague,
George Widland, has written a whole article about this issue. It is all
poppycock. Who decides whether the community should act? Who decides
that the states cannot act? The community decides. If you go to court, the
court going to say, "Do not get us involved. That is a political question."
The states see that their power is slipping, that the bureaucrats in Brussels are
taking it and that the bureaucrats are not that closely supervised. That is the
political reality of the situation. That is why I think that if we give more
power to the Parliament and if we have more direct control over the
Commission, then things are likely to change. However, it will be very hard
to change in Europe where you have fifteen countries. They are not like the
provinces in Canada. They are not like the states in the United States. They
are independent countries. To get them into the mode of cooperative
consolidation will be hard, but it will happen. Why will it happen? Because
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of the perception of the people at large is that working together they are
better off than they would be if they go it alone.
COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: The idea of institutionalizing the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has an appeal, but it is not going
to happen because the U.S. Congress would never agree to it. One of the
things you did touch on, which I think is in the realm of possibility, would be
to institutionalize the NAFTA panel process. In other words, instead of
having ad hoc bodies, which are not working satisfactorily for a number of
reasons, you could institutionalize the dispute settlement process. It seems to
me that is a relatively easy thing to do. An institutionalized panel system
could also deal with the investment dispute. I think that is within the realm
of possibility. It is a long shot, but it's within the realm of possibility. It is at
least worth discussing. Other kinds of institutions within the NAFTA are not
realistic. I would offer one caveat though. Major disputes between Canada
and the U.S. are not going to be dealt with under the NAFTA. The World
Trade Organization (WTO), for a variety of reasons, would handle major
disputes. I think the United States feels that it gets a better hearing and a
better outcome if it takes a bilateral dispute out of the NAFTA context and
into the WTO. That being said, I think the idea of somehow bringing a core
institution into the picture, into the NAFTA picture on the dispute settlement
side, makes sense. It is within the realm of possibility.
COMMENT, MR. SMIT: Experience has shown that if you do that the
institution will significantly define and enhance its role in a matter that is
acceptable because it is perceived not to be political, but dispassionate. In
my estimation, if that is possible, the rest may fall into place.
COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: Provided you do not have the problem of
national judges or judges from one of the three NAFTA countries feeling
they have to support the cause.
MR. SMIT: This is the real problem, how are you going to compose the
tribunal and divorce them from nationalistic influences? I think that maybe
we should devise some way of indirect selection that does not give the
powers to the political orders.
COMMENT, MR. BROSCH: I do not believe that all the major disputes
between Canada and the U.S. are going to be dissolved in the WTO for two
reasons. First, many of the rights that countries are going to assert are rights
that are created only under the NAFTA and do not exist under the WTO.
Second, in a number of the agreements under NAFTA, there is choice of
forum provision that says those kinds of cases, even if they could arise under
both agreements have to be litigated under the NAFTA.
COMMENT, MR. SMIT: If you create an institution that builds its own
reputation for dispassionate resolution, then people want to go there.
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COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: I would disagree on the basis of history.
First, there has not been a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute for years. Second, let
us take for an example the softwood lumber case, if there is a dispute on the
state-to-state basis emerging out of softwood lumber, then it is not going to
go to NAFTA. It is going to the WTO. The Canadian Government will take
it to'the WTO. I think a lot of this depends on the particular context of the
dispute, but history tends to show that both the United States and Canada
prefer to have a matter dealt with in the WTO context then in the NAFTA
context. I am talking in the bilateral state-to-state disputes, not Chapter 19
disputes.
QUESTION, MR. KING: I have a question. Does the fact that there are
a tremendous number of states that want to enter the EU affect your thinking
on the structure? In other words, as you add a lot of the developing worlds as
well as the developed world, does that give you cause for thought on any of
your approaches?
ANSWER, MR. SMLT: It aggravates the problem of keeping the
supranational structure working intact. Is not it significant that all these
states want to join? In Canada, they want to go their different directions. In
Europe, they created a structure and people want to join. Maybe you should
take that as an example. Create that structure and people will want to join.
Why do they want to join? I think a lot of countries want to join because
they want to have the benefit of the open market. Their people can move in
the open market, work anywhere and benefit. The Europeans have
implementing regulations that provide significant measures of social security,
which they would get out of the common fund. This is something. There are
some pies they get a piece of. However, they will have to relinquish at a
given moment that each state is represented in Council. Council could still
be, but a Court cannot be.
COMMENT, MR. HOLLOWAY: Is not the perspective growth of the
EU giving rise to a profound challenge? Surely, it is not just thinking you
are better off. It is thinking enough alike, that is one of the problems. As I
see it, getting all these countries to think alike is a problem. For example,
one of the sources of the problems between the United Kingdom and the EU
is that because of their common law heritage the British and Welsh have
profoundly different view of the nature of rights and responsibilities then
people in the Continent do. So a Romanian or Bulgarian may think they are
better off, but when it comes to actually behaving like a European, it may not
be so easy.
COMMENT, MR. SMIT: But over time, you adjust, right? In England,
there never was a constitutional right to civil liberties. They slipped it in the
back door by ratifying human rights conventions and the Courts picking it
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up. Oh, that is now part of our law and this way we get enforcement of civil
liberties. I think, in time, if you are a member of the same club, you tend to
conform to the standards of the club if you find that to be profitable and
attractive. And do not forget, for these small countries, it is very nice to go
to the European Community. When you join the EU you go to Brussels, you
expand, you participate in decisions that are much more momentous and you
will be part of the mega power of the world.
COMMENT, MR. KING: On that note I would like to thank Mr. Smit
for being with us today. Thank you very much.
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